Abstract: Maritime delimitation is crucial in determining which coastal States may exercise control and jurisdiction over certain hydrocarbon deposits. Although international law has recently become more precise on the matter, boundary disputes are frequently resolved only after several or even many years. Even while coastal States are in a deadlock over delimitation issues, the need to explore and exploit the disputed areas' resources remains imperative for reasons of energy security, social welfare and economic development. Thus, the question arises as to the rights and obligations of coastal States with respect to the development of natural resources in areas subject to overlapping claims.
A. INTRODUCTION
It would not be unreasonable to say that most of the world's maritime boundary conflicts have been resource-induced, most commonly by the known or suspected presence of mineral and fossil-fuel deposits lying in areas over which two or more coastal States may claim control and jurisdiction.
1 Indeed, given that each square metre of subsea territory may potentially hold energy resources worth millions of dollars, the precise location of the boundary would not be a matter of indifference to either of the coastal neighbours affected. It follows that maritime delimitation is crucial in determining which State controls the said resources. However, even though international law has become more precise on the issue in recent times, experience
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is the fact that most of the initial studies on the topic were largely based on examples from case and 83(3), for example, were only introduced by the 1982 Convention: that is, 24 years later.
Nor did State practice regarding offshore petroleum activities provide much evidence in this regard, largely because of the limited deep-sea drilling capabilities prior to the 70s or early 80s.
14 As a consequence, the status of knowledge with regard to the duties of States pending delimitation was rather limited before UNCLOS came into force. Indeed, in the words of Therefore, while by no means irrelevant, these early case-studies cannot be said to form the best set of evidence in terms of determining the substantial content of States' obligations pending delimitation under present international law. Rather, any conclusion deriving from these initial studies needs to be critically reviewed in the light of the more recent case law and State practice. In stark contrast to this important realisation, it can be observed that even the most recent studies on the topic tend to re-cite the conclusions of previous scholars without attempting to understand the evidence on which these conclusions were based. 16 Notwithstanding their manifest political nature, maritime disputes, ie disputes pertaining to the use of the oceans and the seas, are primarily a legal matter governed by the rules and principles of the law of the sea which operates within and draws authority from the overall normative framework of public international law. As a consequence, maritime disputes must be reviewed against the overarching framework of public international law at large. Key is examining the different 'sources' from which the rules of international law, including those relevant to the law of the sea, may be extracted and analysed. 17 For the reasons explained above, the aim of this paper is to shine some fresh light on the evolution of the aforementioned rule in order to ascertain its validity and consistency with the present international law. In doing so, the present paper adopts a more holistic approach:
taking into account both previous studies as well as recent examples from case law and State practice. The central argument advanced is that, in the absence of an agreed boundary or a provisional cooperative agreement, none of the interested States would operate legitimately in undertaking unilateral petroleum activities in areas subject to dispute, should the conduct of such activities prove to aggravate the dispute.
In addition to the above, even though a considerable amount of research has been devoted to the legal duties of States pending delimitation and the possible interim solutions (joint development schemes, for instance), rather less attention has been paid to the practical consequences or implications of said legal duties. In other words, while the majority of authors simply restate the obligations of States in the absence of an agreed boundary and then move on to propose possible solutions, there has been little discussion about how exactly these conflicts impact on oil and gas development in disputed areas. Nevertheless, as a prerequisite for offering a solution, it is necessary first of all to understand the problem, not least from its legal perspective, but also from its commercial and geo-political perspectives. Therefore, this paper also highlights the commercial and political considerations inherent to the exploration and exploitation of disputed subsea mineral and fossil-fuel deposits. This will not only contribute to the overall and in-depth understanding of the various problems associated with the exploitation of disputed natural resources but more importantly, it will provide some clarity on where a possible solution to unlock these practical hurdles might lie. 17 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is universally accepted as the most authoritative statement of the formally recognised sources of international law, in deciding international disputes brought to it, the Court shall apply: a) international conventions; b) international custom; c) the general principles of law; and e) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. coastal States is less than 400nm, the process of maritime delimitation must be initiated as a means to determine where the dividing line between the two entitlements lies.
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The above definitional framework gives rise to an important distinction: the entitlement to a certain maritime area and the delimitation of that area between two, or more, adjacent or opposite coastal States. 29 On the one hand, delimitation is a process which has a de facto subsidiary nature in the sense that it becomes necessary only once overlapping claims have occurred. 30 On the other hand, the inherent nature of a coastal State's sovereign rights over its continental shelf means that this maritime area appertains to the State, regardless of whether it has been previously delimited or not. 31 In other words, both states claim the same exploration and exploitation rights over the same geographic area, yet, pending the final resolution of the dispute, the 'exclusive' holder of these rights remains unknown. It is clear that the alleged rights cannot be said to be exclusive to both states concerned. 37 Moreover, as the ICJ observed, 'evidently any dispute about boundaries must involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe area, to which both parties are laying claim'. 38 In this case, it is presumed that each bona fide claim is legally valid and that each of the claimants is legally entitled to claim the relevant rights to the area in question. 39 Yet, it is one thing to be 'entitled to claim' and it is another to be 'entitled to exercise' the asserted rights.
Indeed, as it will be seen further below, albeit legally entitled to continental shelf and EEZ rights, none of the disputing parties may, from a legal point of view, unilaterally exercise these rights, prior to the final settlement of the dispute. This is because, though both claimants have an inherent right to explore and exploit the given area, at the same time each claimant can preclude one another from embarking upon such activities in the area in question.
Be that as it may, the economic and political implications for the States concerned are enormous. As Ong, a leading expert on the law of the sea, observes, 'with regard to seabed resources which could prove crucial to the well-being and political stability of coastal states, extensive overlapping claims forestall development while boundaries remain uncertain'.
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Given that maritime delimitation, whether by agreement or by reference to third-party adjudication, has historically proven to be an extremely time-consuming process, 41 the interested States may not be able to afford to suspend the economic exploitation of the disputed areas pending delimitation. 42 It is understandable that, even while the boundary remains uncertain, the need for exploring and receiving the economic benefits from disputed natural resources remains imperative for economic, energy-security and political reasons. Clearly, there is a clash between the need for utilizing the disputed natural resources and the legal requirement not to infringe each State's exclusive sovereign rights on the area in question. 37 Fox and others (n 5) 46. No explicit clarification is given regarding the kind of activities that would 'jeopardize or hamper' the final delimitation agreement and would thus be prohibited. Furthermore, the language used in this provision (ie 'shall make every effort') does not clarify the meaning of the procedural requirement to enter into provisional arrangement, 46 in other words, the circumstances under which this obligation can be considered as fulfilled. However, all these aspects are crucial in understanding the legal rights and obligations of States with respect to oil and gas activities in disputed maritime areas. As a consequence, it is essential to examine the relevant international jurisprudence, academic literature and State practice on the application of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in order to ascertain their substantial scope of application and the extent to which they relate to oil and gas operations in disputed areas. Before doing so, however, it is useful to review the drafting history of Articles 74 and 83, particularly the negotiations that led to the formation of paragraph 3 of the said Articles, in order to understand how the rationale underpinning its inception evolved in the minds of UNCLOS drafters: from the early negotiations until its final construction.
Drafting History of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS
It would be going too far to say that, during the negotiations at UNCLOS, no attention was paid to the question of provisional measures pending delimitation but it would be true to say that this issue was not a priority for UNCLOS drafters. This is because the greatest part of the discussions on delimitation centred upon the formation of a commonly acceptable delimitation rule or principle, 47 rather than on interim solutions per se. Nonetheless, the intrinsic correlation between the problems arising from delimitation, clash of sovereign resource exploitation rights, protracted negotiating proceedings etc, and the need for some kind of solution in the interim prompted drafters to simultaneously address the two issues in the same provision. 48 It would appear that, in the course of negotiations, two competing approaches were advanced by the delegations as interim solutions: a) the establishment of a moratorium with regards to all resource-exploitation activities in disputed areas and; b) the conclusion of 'provisional arrangements' pending final agreement on delimitation. As will be seen hereinafter, the final draft of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) constitutes a blend between these two elements, namely the 'restricting' element of prohibiting certain economic acts in the disputed areas and the 'incentive' element of provisional cooperative arrangements.
The first proposals to touch the issue of interim solutions were made by the Netherlands The following section ascertains the extent to which the above provision relates to oil and gas operations in disputed areas. Given that Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS are basically a combination of two different elements, different considerations apply to each of the two elements. Accordingly, for the sake of coherence and analytical clarity, these will be separately examined further below.
Obligation to 'Make Every Effort': Interpreted
According to the first sentence of Articles 74(3) and 83 (3) 88 Provisional Measures, also known as Interim Measures of Protection, are not novel features of in international judicial proceedings, nor in international judicial proceedings involving the international uses of the oceans and the seas. The main rationale for these measures is that a party to a dispute before a court or tribunal is entitled to a reasonable assurance that the subject matter of the dispute will be safeguarded until the court of tribunal delivers its final verdict. It also serves as a protection mechanism as it prevents the disputing states from taking actions that could have the effect of rendering nugatory or of no effect the final decision to be rendered by the court or tribunal. Activities that would meet the standard required for the indication of interim measures, in other words, activities that would justify the use of an exceptional power due to their potential to cause irreparable prejudice, would easily meet the lower threshold of hampering or jeopardising the reaching of a final agreement.
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In other words, the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal, in considering the application of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, aligned its reasoning with the criteria used by international courts and tribunals in assessing a request for interim measures of protection. This led the Tribunal to declare that it should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any unilateral drilling activity since this would prejudice the other party's rights in a permanent manner. 97 On the other hand, seismic surveys were considered, obiter dictum, as legally permissible due to their lower threshold of impact. 
Unilateral Seismic Surveys in Disputed Waters
Notwithstanding the important value of the Aegean Sea Case and Guyana/Suriname Case in assessing the legality of petroleum operations in disputed waters, not all the legal uncertainties surrounding the issue have been resolved. The view that certain activities, due to their manifestly prejudicial and irreparable effect, can justify the prescription of interim measures of protection, cannot in itself imply that any other petroleum activities in the disputed area should be permissible under international law. As a matter of fact, the present analysis finds that there are a number of arguments to support the proposition that, under the present framework of international law, unauthorised seismic surveys in disputed areas are illegal.
To begin with, despite the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal's ruling that seismic surveys in disputed waters should be permissible, 99 one must not disregard the fact that none of the parties involved in the given case had challenged the legality of such activities. 100 On the contrary, the historic background of this dispute indicates that both Guyana and Suriname had been authorising and conducting seismic activities in the disputed areas for over three decades 101 without causing, however, any tensions in their relationship. As a result, it would not be unreasonable to argue that both countries had tacitly consented in a sense to each other's seismic activities in the disputed area. Indeed, the key incident that fuelled the dispute had in issue which '[cannot] be erased by the payment of reparation or compensation to be ordered in later judgment on the merits'. 118 Therefore, activities that give rise to a breach of the alleged rights, but are nonetheless reparable by appropriate means, such as compensation, 119 do not warrant the indication of interim measures. 120 As a matter of fact, Greece's request was dismissed, but not because the Court did not recognise that seismic surveys by Turkey violated Greece's exclusive rights of exploration. 121 On the contrary, the Court recognised that Turkey's activities, without the consent of Greece, 'might, no doubt, raise a question of infringement of the latter's exclusive 135 To that end, coastal
States have the right to object to and order the cessation of any marine scientific project associated with the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 136 Pursuant to the rights above, many coastal States have enabled regulations requiring prospective licensees to submit detailed environmental impact assessments (EIA) prior to the conduct of any seismic surveys, especially if such activities are likely to occur in areas sensitive to protected marine species or fisheries. 137 The purpose of an EIA is to provide the coastal State with information on all the possible adverse impacts of the proposed activity and the measures through which the licensee purports to diminish or at least mitigate these risks to the lowest levels. 138 Therefore, given that the enactment and exercise of these rights does not distinguish between delimited or disputed maritime areas, 139 a State's ability to control, safeguard and apply its own environmental and regulatory policies on the marine environment of the EEZ and continental shelf areas appertaining to it should, in any case, be respected. Interestingly 
D. IMPACT ON OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
The analysis above has demonstrated that, under present international law, States are obliged to refrain from undertaking any unilateral oil and gas activities in disputed waters should the latter prove to aggravate the dispute. What must be kept in mind, however, is that the legal considerations above are by no means of purely academic importance but may also have some serious practical implications on the development of the disputed natural resources.
First and foremost, it is noteworthy that in the absence of the necessary exploration activities, both in terms of seismic testing and exploratory drilling, the exact location and commercial quantity and quality of the area's hydrocarbon deposits cannot be ascertained.
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Notwithstanding that geophysical exploration techniques have been considerably improved during the past decades, 143 exploration for new oil reservoirs still remains a high-risk activity. 144 Indeed, according to petroleum geologists, even if seismic testing has taken place and the geological conditions of the area in question seem to be promising, 145 only the drilling of an exploration well can indicate whether the relevant area is commercially exploitable or not. 146 Moreover, drilling is critically important in terms of understanding the structural properties of the sea-bed for the purpose of constructing rigs and mooring buoys as foundations for platforms and for laying pipelines. 147 However, as it has been previously explained, any kind of drilling in disputed areas without the consent of other interested State(s) is prohibited under international law and can be ceased through the application of provisional measures if the dispute is submitted before an international court or tribunal.
That being the case, unless States agree on a boundary or enter a provisional cooperative arrangement, there would be only two options, or lines of action, available to the States concerned. The first option is that, pending the final settlement of the dispute, no unilateral action, including any form of drilling, is to be conducted by either State in the disputed area.
Given, however, the significance of drilling in terms of new oil-field development, this option implies that the economic exploitation of the disputed area cannot go forward pending delimitation. The Aegean Sea is an example of this situation. There, Greece and Turkey agreed to refrain from any acts that would aggravate their dispute, including the authorisation and conduct of exploration activities in the disputed area. 148 As a result, given that no delimitation agreement between the two States has been reached so far, the mineral potentials of the Aegean Sea remain to date unexploited. 150 120 nautical miles off the coast of the Vietnamese mainland. 151 In spite of strong protests by Vietnam, China refused to halt its drilling operations, stating that the rig was placed 'completely within the waters of China's Paracel Islands.' 152 The event received a great deal of publicity and triggered massive anti-Chinese riots within
Vietnam, especially when the latter accused China of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese vessel which was at the vicinity of the rig. 153 At least two people were killed during the riots, while many Chinese-run factories were burned to the ground, and several supply operations had to be halted for security reasons. 154 The United States, a powerful actor in the area, called on China to 'freeze' its provocative actions and seek to diffuse tension in the area. 155 In the light of the above, on 15 July 2014, China announced that it was withdrawing its 2 billion dollar rig from the disputed area, almost one and a half months before the end of the envisaged drilling schedule. 156 Most importantly, in October 2015, China proposed joint maritime drills with South China Sea claimants as an attempt at 'jointly solving disputes and controlling risks'. 157 It would appear that the dangerously escalating nationalistic overtones in the Vietnamese mainland and the risk of prejudicing its relations with other State actors in the area, such as the United States, prompted China to cease its drilling operations in the disputed South China Sea areas and turn to other cooperative and confidence-building mechanisms. It may thus be said that even though unilateral drilling remains a theoretically possible option, the huge geopolitical and legal risks it portends mean that such an option, at least from a commercial perspective, is highly unadvisable.
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At this point, it is also very important to note that the development of offshore oil and gas deposits is, besides being a high-risk activity, an extremely expensive task as well. 159 By way of example, a modern 3D seismic vessel costs around 100 million USD, 160 seismic data acquisition and processing can be as high as 0.5 million USD for a small area of 100 square kilometres, 161 whilst the cost of drilling an offshore well can be over 50 million USD. 162 Given the huge capital outlays involved in offshore petroleum development, States often rely on the funds and technical expertise of international oil and gas companies to develop their indigenous hydrocarbon resources. 163 The first step an international oil company will take in deciding what regions of the world are promising is evaluating and ascertaining the geological, technical, political, fiscal, and environmental conditions of the given regions. 164 Even if geological conditions indicate the likelihood of technically recoverable hydrocarbons, political and economic conditions, such as government and regulatory stability, must also be favourable for the successful commercialisation of the said reserves. 165 Oil companies must have a firm casescenario in place that the potential revenues from future production justify present investments in exploration.
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Regions with undefined or disputed maritime borders are characterised by excessive territorial uncertainty. Specifically, there is uncertainty as to which of the two, or more, claimants holds exclusive rights and authority over petroleum operations in the area(s) in question. For oil companies, the corresponding effect of this uncertainty is the creation of moderate political risks: that is, the probability that the goals of their investment can be adversely affected by future changes in the political and national investment regime. 167 As Lax notes, whereas uncertainty concerns a 'subjective potentiality of loss' based on existing political and economic conditions, a political risk is a 'measurable probability of loss' resulting from a change in those conditions. 168 In that sense, oil companies cannot predict what the final outcome of the dispute will be, nor can they influence the adjudicating body's decision.
However, they are perfectly aware that the dispute may lead to a change of jurisdiction in which case their exploration and exploitation rights will not be guaranteed. 169 According to some petroleum experts, 'an uncertain or disputed international boundary is an additional risk factor' the essence of which lies in the 'uncertainty with regard to the geographic scope of a concession area'. 170 Indeed, any company that knowingly decides to undertake investments in a disputed area could be left without a secure title to its investment if the relevant concession area is ultimately determined to belong to a neighbouring state, or if the latter seeks the termination of the ongoing petroleum operations through an injunction, pending the judicial settlement of the dispute. As the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) explained, 'a secure investment framework including legal security of tenure is a sine qua non for the development [of offshore oil and gas deposits]'. 171 However, none of these vital investment conditions (ie regional stability, legal security of tenure, etc) can be guaranteed in areas subject to the overlapping sovereignty of two, or more, States. 
E. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that, with respect to the economic development of characterise disputed regions, largely because of their undefined territorial status, mean that large offshore oil and gas investors most often tend to avoid venturing into those areas.
Ultimately, in the absence of an agreed boundary, only provisional interstate cooperation, such as joint exploration and development, can enable disputing parties to facilitate investments and realise the economic potentials of disputed areas.
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